We present single event effect test results for the Intel 80386 microprocessor, the 80387 coprocessor, the 823 80 peripheral device, and am the 80486 microprocessor. Both single event upset and latc.hup conditions were monitored.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 80386 and 80486 microprocessors hold several distinct advantages over radiation-hardened microprocessors. These include reducing both cost and design time for spaceflight missions. This is accomplished by being industry-standard as well as commercially available devices with many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) s o h a r e applications, development tools, and operating systems. The 80386 microprocessor is currently in use on several spaceflight projects, while the 80486 is being considered for other projects. In particular, the 80386 is currently flying on Hubble Space Telescope (HST) and Solar Anomalous Magnetospheric Particle Explorer (SAMPEX), and is baselined for utilization on Earth Observing Satellite (EOS-AM), X-ray Timing Explorer (XTE), and Tropical Rainforest Measurement Mission (TRMM). The 80486 is currently being considered as a candidate HST replacement processor as part of the HST servicing program. This appears to be a spaceflight trend: utilizing commercial-type devices and up-screening them as per mission requirements.
However, the use of these commercial parts in spaceflight raises the issue of vulnerability to single event effects (SEE). A single event upset (SEU -a transient or bit flip) in a microprocessor's control unit rnay "crash" (halt or cause improper operation) a spacecraft system or subsystem. Worse yet would be an uncorrected single event latchup (SEL -a high-current condition) that may permanently damage a device or an entire system. It is essential to determine how vulnerable these commercial devices are to such SEEs. These experiments were performed in an effort to understand the effect of SEEs on a microprocessor from a system level standpoint: to determine how the use of these technologies will affect the system as a whole.This is a key difference from traditional piecepart testing.
Two to three samples of each device were tested. This is a compromise between test costs and time versus statistical validity. Table 1 describes these integrated circuits (ICs).
Three device types from the 80386 microprocessor family were tested: the 80386, 80386, and 82380. The 80386 itself is a general purpose 32-bit microprocessor. Test samples had maximum operating clock frequencies of 20 and 25 MHz (see Table I ) that were derated to operate at 16 MHz. The 80386DX has been tested previously [ 1, 2] by NASA/GSFC and JPL, but as results may vary between lots, several lots were tested for various spaceflight projects. The 80387 math coprocessor is an extension to the 80386 microprocessor.
It dramatically increases processing speed of 80386 application software. The 82380 peripheral integrates numerous functions necessary in a 80386 operating environment; the device acts as DMA controller, interrupt controller, interval timer, wait state generator, DRAM refresh controller, and system reset logic.
The 80486 microprocessor incorporates significant enhancements over the 80386. By integrating the microprocessor with the 80387 math coprocessor, on-chip cache memory, a clock doubler, and RISC design, operational performance is greatly enhanced. Because of differences in the manufacturing process (CHMOS IV and V), both the 80486DX33 and the 80486DX2-66 required testing. Devices from three potential spaceflight lots of 80486DX2-66 were tested because of the possibility of variance between lots. Slight changes in manufacturing process may have great impact on the SEE sensitivity of a device.
Objectives of this series of tests were to determine several SEE experimental parameters. For heavy ion tests, the linear energy transfer (LET) threshold (LET,,,) is defined as the LET in MeV*cm2/mg where SEE is first observed during testing, at fluence 1E6 or 1E7 particles/cm2. All LETs discussed are in MeV*cm2/mg. Additionally, a device cross section or sensitivity versus tested LETs were noted. For proton SEE results, device cross section versus proton energy was determined. particles/cm2 (1E6 particles/cm' was often used to reduce the amount of total dose exposure of the DUT: we were worried about device failure and only had a limited number of samples). Devices were delidded to accommodate beam penetration limits.
TEST PROCEDURE

A. Test Facilities
TEST DEVICES
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2) Proton Test Facility
Proton SEE testing was performed at the University of Califomia at Davis (UCD) Cyclotron facility. Proton flux was typically 1E8 particles/cm'/sec with a fluence of lElO particles/cm' . The proton beam was tuned to the facility's maximum energy of 63 MeV, and degraded using A1 shields to 38.2 MeV and 26.6 MeV, respectively. Energies and fluxes were measured as those incident on the DUT package.
B. Test Technique
All devices were tested both with input power supply voltages of V,, + 5%. V,, for all devices was 5V. Temperature for testing was a nominal 25 deg C. 
1) 80386 Family Techniques
The 80386, 80387, and 82380 were mounted on a custom-designed single-board computer (SBC) that was placed inside the BNL vacuum test chamber. Also included in the test system were a Personal Computer (PC) for SBC functional monitoring, power supply, SEU counter, and a PC-based testerthe Omnilab. The Omnilab monitored the DUT power supply for SEL via an IEEE 488 interface. A custom software operating system was developed to operate the DUTs.
Previous tests' by NASA/JPL had been performed register by register: each register was loaded with known data, and its contents were monitored while irradiated the device. While this is a valid test method, providing useful data, it does not reflect normal operating conditions in most 80386 applications. Therefore, an active test was performed to simulate typical device operat ion: the microprocessor operated in protected mode, continuously performing a data writelreadcheck cycle.
The SEUs obslsrved may be classified by the effects they had on the system: either data or operational errors (lockup). For the 80386, Datu SEUs -incorrect data or addressing informationwere detected in software. During the 80387 test, the DUT continuously performed a mathematical operation, and reported the result for a software check. Datu SEUs, here, were defmed as incorrect answers. The DMA function of the 82380 was tested by having the DUT perform DMA transfers continuously, while softwar~e monitored transfers for incorrect data. Datu SEUs were defined as incorrect or incomplete data transfers. Additionally, all three devices experienced lockup SEUs, requiring a so hare-based reset or an external hardware reset signal to recover. Removal of device power (or a power reset)
was not required to remove this condition. Lockup was most likely due to si hit to the control area, placing the device in an undefined statje. Test runs were halted when lockup occurred. At higher LETS, immediate lockup prevented collecting of detailed SEU data. However, SEL tests were still performed. The power supply input current to the DUTs were set at levels just above maximum for the DUT during SEL testing. This is true for all device types tested.
2) 80486 Techniques
The 80486 DTJT board is again custom-designed SBC, but in this case involving two microprocessors, a DUT and a reference device, operaling synchronously or in lock-step. DUT and reference address, data and control lines are compared real-time by an on-board comparator. The test system also includes a power supply, SEU counter, and the Omnilab to monitor the power supply for SEL. Custom software provides the operating system and interface to the DUTs. Different software routines (system, paging, co-processor, external memory access, and software performance) exercised the 80486's many functions, including memory readdwrites, DMA operations, and interrupts. The "system" routine, reflecting a worst-case 80,486 spaceflight application, was used for most test runs. 80486 tests were performed both with internal cache enabled and disabled.
A non-compare SEU was defined as mismatch between DUT and reference device address, data or control lines, upon which a reset signal was issued to the DUT to clear the condition, During a lockup SEU, both DUT and reference enter halt states, requiring a power reset to clear. This is theorized based on observed device behavior to be caused by the DUT entering an internal test mode.
3) All Test Devices
Two different types of latchup were encountered. Traditional or destructive SEL occurred when device current consumption (Icc) increased above the maximum specified for the device. During microlatchup, I,, may increase above the normal operating level, but not above the maximum specified for the device. Device operation halts, and a power reset is required to recover. A series of microlatch events in quick succession can mimic destructive SEL, so low flux rates are required to observe microlatch. This was noted in reference 111.
IV. TEST RESULTS
Several devices were tested with V,, f 5% ; no statistical difference was noted versus nominal Vcc. For 80486 testing, utilizing different software was only briefly explored: worst case system software was used for almost all test runs. It is expected that some variation (+/-30%) from software to software would be seen, with more cache-intensive programs being more vulnerable to SEU when the cache is enabled.
Results are summarized in Table 4 . Figure 1 illustrates the dataset described below for the 80386 devices. 
1.oOE-02 .
A) MG80386DX-20/B
Both data and lockup SEUs were first observed at an LET of 4.14. Above LETs of 1 1.4, devices were tested for SEL only, due to immediate device lockup during the test runs. Note that the lesson learned from this latter problem was to incorporate automatic device software resets into the test setup. We did this for the 80486 testing.
Destructive SEL was not detected during any test run. The LET, for microlatch, however, was noted to be between LETs of 37.1 and 59.9. A dwell test, where the DUT was placed into a microlatch condition and allowed to continue to draw current for a ten minute period, was performed to determine if the microlatch was destructive to the DUT. It was not; the DUT was fully operational after a reset. This, however, was not a statistically reliable test; detailed reliability analysis of localized (within the device) current consumption should be explored as well.
B) 80386DX-25
SEL: This device was tested for SEL only. Microlatch was the only condition detected, with a threshold between LET 26.2 and 37.1. Devices were tested at both 5V and 5.25V. Destructive SEL was not observed on any test run.
C) MG80387-20/B
Data from these devices is presented in Figure 2 . Data SEUs were detected starting at an LET of 3.38. A stuck bit, i.e. a register or data value that remains at a certain logic level (high Above an LET of 37.1, devices were tested for SEL only, due to immediate lockup during test runs.
The LET, for destructive SEL is between 37.1 and 59.9. No microlatch SEL was noted.
failure was not noted. No explanation is offered at this time.
F) 80486DX-33
Non-compare with cache enabled SEUs were observed at the lowest LET tested of 3.53. The LET, appears to be around 3 based on curve fitting. This is illustrated in Figure 4 . Data from this device is presented in Figure 3 . Data SEUs were first observed at an LET of 4.14. This device experienced lockup at all ]LET values tested, beginning at 3.38. At an LET of 11. 4 and above, devices were tested for SEL only, due to immediate 1oc:kup during test runs.
. . . 
E) 82380-16
This device was tested for SEL only. Traditional latchup was
observed at the lowest LET tested of 12. A dwell test was performed, allowing the DUT to operate for two minutes at a high current induced by SEL (850 mA, with specified device maximum of 300 mA). The 82380 recovered fdly, following apower reset. This, however, was not a statistically reliable test; detailed reliability analysis should be explored as well. Non-compare with cache disabled SEUs were not detected at the lowest LET tested of 3.53. The LET, is between 3.83 and 8.27, and appears to be around 5-6. Figure 5 presents this data. Lockup was not observed due to test setup limitation. The device was not retested.
3 1*00E-03 1
In another test Iufl, following SEL, the Operating Current decreased (by --20 mA in 2 minutes) of its own accord. Device
Proton SEE testing was performed as well at a proton energy of 267 63 MeV. With a nominal V, of 5V and the internal device cache disabled, no SEUs were observed. When V,, was reduced to 4.75V, a few sporadic errors were detected. With the internal cache enabled, the device was approximately an order of magnitude more sensitive to proton-induced SEUs. Device cross section was 4E-10cm2 with cache enabled and <SE-1 lcm' with it disabled.
Proton SEE testing also may be used for total dose testing as well. Three device samples were tested thusly at the UCD facility. Two samples failed parametrically, but not functionally at total dose levels of 12-15 kRad(Si), while one sample failed functionally as well.
G) 804860x2-66
Devices from three separate lots were tested, with varying SEE characteristics. Figure 6 represents the overall SEU data for two lots (Lots 1 and 2) that were tested. The third lot was tested more recently and will be talked about for general characteristics only. SEU data for lot 3 is consistent with those of lots 1 and 2.
From Figure 6 , non-compare with cache enabled SEUs were not detected at the lowest tested LET of 4. The LET, , thus, is between LET values of 4 and 7.79 and would appear to be roughly 5-6. Proton SEE testing was also performed using the UCD facility.
With a V, of 5V and the internal cache disabled, a few sporadic errors were observed (but not on every test run)at proton energies of 63 and 38.2 MeV, respectively. With the device cache enabled, the device was approximately an order of magnitude more sensitive to proton-induced SEUs. No SEUs were detected at an energy of 26.6 MeV.
Little variance was noted due to dropping supply voltage to 4.75V. Figure 9 illustrates the results for this device.
During proton SEE irradiaiton, test samples failed parametrically at total dose levels of 35-80 kRad(Si). None of the samples failed functionally. Recent total dose testing at NASAIGSFC has been performed on two of the candidate spaceflight lots using a CO-60 source. On lot 2, the data was consistent with the proton total dose results (parametric failure araound 30 kRad(Si). Lot 3 CO-60 testing has just been performed. Failure appears to be around 20-25 kRad(Si). The fist failure this time was functional and not parametric.
demonstrated destructive SEL, current limiting at the device level would be required as a minimum.
1.ooE-11 I-, 
V. IMPLICATIONS
Implications mily be viewed from two sides: those that impact the spacecraft dlesigner, and those that impact the SEE tester or ICdesigner.
From the spacecraft perspective, usability of the DUT is realistically all that is required. A last note is based on the limited total dose test dated presented on the 80486DX2-66. The variance between lots for failure mechanisms (parametric versus functional) is of future interest and shall be explored accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the increased use of commercial technology in spaceflight, designers must be concerned with the impact of radiation on the devices. We have presented SEE test data on select microprocessors and their associated peripheral devices. This data may aid in the selection of proper error mitigative techniques, and in predicting the impact that the use of commercial technology may have on future mission success.
